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INTRODUCTION

HE past five years have witnessed growing enthusiasm for negotiation as an alternative to adjudication in resolving envi-
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ronmental disputes. The appeal of this form of dispute
resolution can be seen in the increasing use of negotiation in both
state and federal statutory schemes and policies.
A number of states have established mediation offices to encourage negotiated resolution of site specific environmental disputes. Some states have gone a step farther and have explicitly
included negotiation in their statutory schemes for siting locally
undesirable land use activities such as hazardous waste facilities.'
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has begun to experiment with negotiated rulemaking as an alternative to traditional administrative practice in order to expedite
the rulemaking process and to curb subsequent judicial challenges by parties interested in the outcome of the rulemaking
process. 2 The courts have also embraced negotiation as a means
to encourage settlement of large scale, complex, multiparty lawsuits arising out of Superfund 3 liability.
While negotiation offers the promise of potentially swifter,
more efficient resolution of disputes than does traditional adjudication, it is not without its challenges. In many environmental
disputes, it is not obvious which parties should be at the bargaining table. This is especially true of non-site specific disputes and
disputes in which large, diffuse, non-homogeneous groups are involved. Even if the appropriate parties are identified, the process
is open-ended and not necessarily decisive unless the parties are
motivated by an externally imposed deadline or by other incentives for them to negotiate and reach agreement.
1. See Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Massachusetts
Siting Act]; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (West 1989); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, § 2172 (Supp. 1990).
2. For example, in promulgating regulations for the implementation of section 301(h) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, EPA employed the informal rulemaking process of section 553 of title 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. This process allows interested parties to present documented
information and arguments without going through the adjudicatory hearing required by the formal rulemaking process. For an analysis of EPA's rulemaking
process for the section 301(h) regulations, see LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL
WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 280-303 (1984) [hereinafter
BACOW & WHEELER]. For a discussion of negotiated rulemaking by administrative agencies, see Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 471 (1986); Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before FederalAgencies: Evaluation
of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J.
1625 (1986).
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), as amended by the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(Supp. V 1987).
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BINDING PARTIES TO AGREEMENTS

Parties that are able to reach an agreement must still confront the question of enforcing that agreement. Absent judicial
supervision, they will be on their own to structure their future
relationship in order to assure that the agreement reached at the
bargaining table is not subsequently disregarded. This problem
of binding parties to a negotiated agreement in environmental
disputes is the central focus of this Article.
II.

WHY CARE ABOUT COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS?

The possibility of non-compliance with a negotiated agreement may in itself prevent the negotiation process from beginning. If the parties fear compliance problems, they are unlikely to
come to the bargaining table in the first place. For example,
neighbors opposed to a new municipal landfill are unlikely to
enter into negotiations with the landfill operator to determine the
terms and conditions under which they might be willing to accept
the landfill if they believe that the operator will not honor those
terms and conditions.
In some cases, the parties' intentions may be entirely honorable but they may lack the legal capacity to enter into a binding
agreement. This is especially true of municipalities which may be
legally prohibited from contracting away their policymaking powers. 4 Thus, in some cases, deals may be thwarted by the inability
of a mayor, for example, to bind his political successor. Similarly,
some organizations, such as environmental interest groups, may
lack the legal authority or political ability to bind their members.
While rare, these legal capacity problems may prevent otherwise
efficient deals from taking place.
Negotiation leading to an agreement which is subsequently
breached is a sterile exercise. It wastes the time and resources of
all parties concerned and may be detrimental to future relationships. Because compliance problems may have the effect of negating the accomplishments of the negotiation process, an
examination of such problems is of paramount importance to the
success of negotiations.
4. For example, contract zoning, the process by which a landowner
promises to restrict the use of his property and the municpality in return
promises to permit rezoning, has been generally been held to be "an ultra vires
bargaining away of police power" and therefore illegal. 101A C.J.S. Zoning and
Land Planning§ 21 (1979). See also 1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
5.02(3) (1978).
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A CONCEPTUAL LOOK AT COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS

The best way to understand why compliance problems are
common in environmental disputes is to examine why they may or
may not arise in other situations. There are four basic agreement
scenarios, each of which generates its own compliance problems.
A.

Mutual Simultaneous Performance Concurrent With
Agreement

Many simple negotiations culminate in mutual simultaneous
performance. In a flea market, for example, the parties bargain
back and forth, the buyer examines the article for purchase, and if
the buyer and seller agree on a price, the deal is closed immediately. Compliance problems do not arise because performance
occurs simultaneously with agreement, and the buyer takes the
goods subject to the principle of caveat emptor. Because performance is rendered at the same time the deal is closed, failure to
perform is tantamount to failure to reach agreement.
B.

An Exchange of Promises for Mutually Simultaneous
Performance

More complicated is the situation where the parties agree to
perform their obligations at some time in the future. For example, a deal to sell a used car at an agreed upon price is rarely
executed immediately. Typically the buyer will want to have the
car inspected, titled and insured, and the seller will want the
buyer to present him with cash or a certified check. Separation in
time between agreement and performance introduces the potential problem of the executory contract; this may be mitigated by
simultaneous performance.
C.

Exchange of Promise for Performance

The situation with the greatest potential for compliance
problems occurs when one party to a transaction performs immediately while the other party does not perform until some time in
the future. For example, a governmental body which issues a permit for a landfill must wait to see if the developer of the landfill
will build and operate it in accord with the terms and conditions
of the permit. Once one party has rendered performance, the
other party has received the bulk of the benefit of its bargain and
has little incentive to perform, unless the law, honor, or some
concern for future relationships encourages performance.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/4
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Continuing Versus One-time Negotiation

Compliance problems arise less often when the parties have a
continuing relationship. The need to agree in the future acts as a
powerful incentive for each side to honor their current commitments. 5 For example, intentional non-compliance is rarely an issue in labor negotiations because members of each side know that
they will have to face each other over the same set of issues when
the next collective bargaining agreement is negotiated. In this
scenario, the possibility of retaliation in the future discourages
non-compliance.
In light of the four basic agreement scenarios, it is easy to see
why environmental disputes often give rise to compliance
problems. In addition to the capacity problems noted above, environmental disputes are invariably about actions to be taken in
the future. Performance is never simultaneous with agreement.
Moreover, typically one side, often the side which is being asked
for permission to depart from the status quo, must perform well in
advance of the other side. Once the government or the neighbors
have acquiesced in the change proposed by the other party (e.g.,
the dam is built, the forest is cut, the landfill is sited), the damage
to the environment has occurred. This damage may be irreversible and the party that has allowed the departure from the status
quo must wait, often for years, to see if the other party lives up to
its promises to mitigate such damage.
In contrast to labor disputes, often the parties to environmental disputes engage each other only once; the proponent of a
new hazardous waste facility is unlikely to go back to the same
community for permission to build a second similar facility in the
future. For the foregoing reasons, compliance often looms large
as a problem in negotiating the resolution of environmental
disputes.
5. The "Brown Paper" case is an excellent example of how the need to
work with the other party in the future can provide the necessary motivation for
compliance. During the 1970's, the Brown Paper Company (Brown) was the
largest source of sulfur dioxide air pollution in New Hampshire. Injuly of 1979,
after 18 months of negotiations, Brown and EPA reached an agreement whereby
Brown would spend more than $16.5 million on measures to reduce pollution
and in return EPA would relax certain requirements that might otherwise have
driven Brown out of business. Due to this need for a continuing relationship
with EPA, Brown had a large incentive (its very existence) to comply with the
agreement. For an analysis of Brown's negotiations with EPA, see BACOW &
WHEELER at 56-70.
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NON-COMPLIANCE: A CAUSAL TAXONOMY

Negotiation often begins before the parties sit down at the
bargaining table and continues after the agreement is reached.
Sophisticated negotiators spend as much time worrying about the
incentives to comply as they do about the incentives to negotiate.
The model that follows distinguishes three types of non-compliance that may arise in environmental disputes: intentional noncompliance, unavoidable non-compliance and unintentional noncompliance. A better understanding of the causes of non-compliance will lead to a better understanding of the mechanism best
suited to address the non-compliance problem.
A.

Intentional Non-compliance

A party may elect not to comply for a number of reasons.
Circumstances may have changed prior to implementation of any
phase of a negotiated agreement. Just as the parties may carefully
calculate the costs and benefits of settlement prior to reaching an
agreement, such calculation is likely to continue while the agreement is still executory. If at some stage a party believes that a
breach will be more beneficial or cost effective than performance,
that party will have little incentive to abide by the agreement.
A party may repudiate an agreement after it has started to
take effect if he has already received the bulk of the expected benefits but has yet to incur the subsequent costs. For example, in a
dispute in Jackson, Wyoming in the early 1970's, the town and
county differed on how a new wastewater treatment facility would
be built. 6 While both sides agreed that a new plant was needed to
replace the outmoded facility, the county was reluctant to acquiesce in the construction of a new plant because it feared that the
new plant would stimulate excessive growth in rural parts of the
county. The obvious solution was for the county to extract a
promise from the town to limit development in rural areas, but
the county feared that once the plant was built, the town would
7
have little incentive to comply with such an agreement.
Another kind of breach occurs when a party deliberately vio6. For an analysis of the Jackson Hole case, see BACOW & WHEELER at 12743.
7. With EPA Region 8 officials acting as mediators, the town and the county
did agree to an annual limit on the number of new sewer taps. The tap limit was
raised significantly in the final agreement, however, when the composition of the
county commission changed to a pro-growth majority. BAcow & WHEELER at
142-43.
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lates an agreement but hopes that others will not detect the
breach. For example, a developer who has negotiated the terms
of approval for a subdivision from a planning board may try to get
away with building a cheaper roadbed than was called for in the
permit.
Sometimes parties repudiate agreements that they actually
would like to see honored. Typically this occurs when they believe others have already breached. Even if the retaliatory breach
is partial, this type of action can invite a similar response, and the
entire agreement can unravel. In the case of the developer trying
to get away with a cheaper roadbed, the town may withhold building permits for the developer if it believes he is shortchanging the
planning board on the infrastructure. If the developer lacks
building permits and cannot sell lots, he may be incapable of generating the funds needed to make the promised improvements.
B.

Unavoidable Non-compliance

Agreements may be breached due to a party's inability to
comply. For example, implementation of new pollution control
abatement technology may be delayed if the manufacturer cannot
provide the specified equipment in a timely fashion. In Massachusetts, a problem has arisen involving government regulation
and monitoring of proposed hazardous waste facilities. Host
communities are reluctant to accept promises by the state that
such new facilities will be carefully monitored because they fear
that the legislature will render the state financially incapable of
performing by not consistently appropriating the necessary
funds .8
C.

Unintentional Non-compliance

Unintentional breaches may occur as a result of poor communication in the negotiation process or sloppy drafting of the
agreement itself. If a party cannot understand or interpret an ambiguous term of the agreement, his chosen course of action might
be perceived by the other party as a breach. Parties should expect
disputes over interpretation of negotiated agreements and should
provide mechanisms within the structure of the agreement for
resolving these ambiguities.
8. The Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, which performs the
monitoring of the hazardous waste facilities, "may receive and expend such
funds as are appropriated ..
" Massachusetts Siting Act § 4.
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ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

Understanding the causes of non-compliance gives rise to a
better understanding of enforcement mechanisms. Once a cause
of non-compliance is identified, the appropriate enforcement
mechanism can be incorporated into the agreement itself. The
objective of each of these mechanisms is to render any negotiated
agreement self-executing.
A.

Structured Implementation

Because environmental disputes often give rise to an exchange of promise for performance, it is important to structure
the implementation of the agreement so that the parties have an
ongoing incentive to comply. A clever arrangement of "carrots
and sticks" may encourage compliance, whereas a lack of foresight may encourage breach midway through implementation.
This point is best illustrated by an example.
An operator of a municipal landfill was seeking permission
from a town to expand the landfill. The town was reluctant to
agree because neighbors had complained of wind-blown litter
from the facility. According to the terms of the operator's permit,
he was obligated to cover the trash at the end of each day with a
layer of dirt to prevent such litter. The neighbors alleged that the
operator was negligent in covering the trash due to the time and
expense of purchasing fill to cover the daily haul.
After discussing complicated penalty clauses designed to
encourage compliance, the parties with the aid of a mediator fashioned an agreement which simultaneously encouraged compliance, discouraged disputes and provided for resources to clean
up any litter problem that might occur. The operator agreed to
make contributions on an annual basis to a fund which would be
used to hire teenagers to clean up wind-blown litter. The fund
would be controlled by the town, and at the end of each year any
non-expended funds would be distributed equally between the
town and the operator.
By placing the funds under the control of the town, this
agreement avoided disputes over whether a litter problem actually existed. If the town thought there was a problem, the town
had the resources to clean it up. Because non-expended funds
were split between the town and the operator, the operator had a
financial incentive to control the litter. Similarly, the town had an
incentive not to exploit the fund or needlessly bother the operahttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/4
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tor about minor problems because it stood to benefit directly if
the funds were not expended.
B.

Contingent Agreements

Environmental disputes are frequently marked by the mutual
distrust of the parties. Communities are often skeptical when
proponents of change claim that their projects will not have a detrimental impact on the environment. One reason for this skepticism is that the proponents of change usually stand to gain if the
change is accepted. To solve this problem, the parties might negotiate a contingent agreement in which the proponent of a project would specify the corrective measures it would take if certain
specified contingencies were to occur. To ensure that capital is
available to pay for the corrective measures, the project proponents might be required to post a bond or a letter of credit.
Again, an illustration might be helpful. One common fear of
neighbors of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs), such as landfills and hazardous waste facilities, is that construction of such
projects will diminish the value of their homes. Such neighbors
usually are skeptical when presented with any evidence to the
contrary.
One approach, assuming there are not too many homes involved, would be for the developer of such a facility to guarantee
contractually the future value of the neighboring homes. The developer would agree to pay the difference between a future sales
price and an index price determined by reference to valuation of
homes in comparable areas not adjacent to such a facility. Such a
guarantee is inexpensive for the developer, especially if he is confident that the facility will not adversely affect property values.
Moreover, the existence of the guarantee gives him an incentive
to operate the facility so that it does not diminish housing values.
The guarantee also should reduce the anxiety of the homeowners,
as they will be fully compensated if the feared harm occurs.
C.

Monitoring Devices

Closely related to the contingent agreement strategy is the
use of monitoring devices. If the parties enter into a contingent
agreement, a mechanism needs to be devised for determining
when the contingency occurs. The parties might monitor the situation themselves, or they might engage the services of a neutral
third party.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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In crafting monitoring agreements it is important to be as
specific as possible concerning the methodology to be used to
gather and interpret data. Specificity about the methodology of
the monitoring scheme helps eliminate subsequent disagreements about data ambiguities and may help control the costs of
administering the scheme.
D.

Performance Bonds

Commercial contracts often provide for performance bonds
that are intended to encourage compliance and to provide a remedy in the event of a breach. The same concept is equally applicable to a number of environmental disputes. For example, it is
common for a planning board to require some type of bond posting as part of subdivision plan approval. These boards seek to
prevent the developer from dividing up the land and selling each
lot before he has built the required infrastructure.
The solution to the board's dilemma is to place a lien on a
sufficient number of lots so that if the developer fails to make the
improvements, those lots can be sold by the board to pay for the
improvements. Performance bonds and liens represent a way of
manipulating incentives to ensure compliance while providing an
expedited mechanism for bringing relief to the non-breaching
party.
E.

Penalty Clauses

Conceptually a penalty or liquidated damage clause is similar
to a performance bond except that the non-breaching party must
resort to a lawsuit to claim the damages. By increasing the transaction costs and the uncertainty associated with obtaining damages, such provisions are a less efficient means of assuring
compliance than are performance bonds, monitoring devices or
contingent agreements.
F.

Grievance and Arbitration Procedures

Rare is the agreement that is not subject to some interpretation. Wise negotiators anticipate disagreements over interpretation of terms and provide for the resolution of such disputes.
Agreements structured to govern environmental relationships
can provide for grievance and arbitration procedures 9 similar to
9. Section 12 of the Massachusetts Siting Act requires that developers of
hazardous waste facilities and communities where those facilities are to be sited
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those that exist in collective bargaining agreements.
G.

Consent Decrees

Where the parties have entered into negotiations at the urging of a court, they can often look to the court to incorporate
their agreement into a consent decree. Judges are often reluctant
to do this, especially when they have not participated in fashioning the agreement. The effect of such judicial ratification is to
make the contempt powers of the court available to exact compliance with the negotiated agreement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Problems of compliance with negotiated agreements are
often miscast as problems of ensuring trust between the parties.
If a successful agreement were contingent on mutual trust, few
agreements would be reached. A better strategy is to presume
mistrust and try to structure around it. With a good understanding of the nature of the particular compliance problems at hand,
clever negotiators will often fashion self-executing agreements
that give the parties incentives to comply and that avoid future
disputes. These are all signs of a well-crafted agreement.
Negotiating the resolution of environmental disputes is usually harder than litigating them. While the litigator need only be
an advocate, the negotiator must actually assume the responsibility of trying to solve the problem. This requires understanding
not only the interests of one's client, but also the interests of all
the other parties in the search for common ground. Moreover,
negotiators must be concerned not only with the requirements of
the law, but also with how the agreement is likely to be implemented in fact, how it will be paid for, and how it will be sold to
the interested parties. This represents a broader range of issues
than one typically confronts in the courtroom and makes environmental dispute resolution both challenging and interesting.
incorporate into their negotiated agreements provisions for arbitration of any
disputes which might arise.
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